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Introduction 
The  approaches  to  human  resource  management  (hereafter  HRM)  and  the  employment 
practices adopted by employers change over time, as the circumstances that surround organizations 
evolve. In recent years, firms are facing an increasingly global and competitive business environment, 
as well as unpredictable and rapidly changing product markets. Hence, they need to look for HRM 
strategies  that,  on  the  one  hand,  are  innovative  and  provide  them  with  a  source  of  competitive 
advantage and, on the other, leave scope for flexibility in order to adapt to changing circumstances. As 
a result, certain HRM practices are gaining popularity among employers. One of these practices is pay 
for performance (see Brown and Heywood, 2002), which is considered to improve organizational 
outcomes by enhancing employee motivation and identification with the objectives of the firm, and by 
promoting the sense of fairness among employees (see Pfeffer, 1998). Moreover, pay for performance 
also    enables  flexibility  within  the  firm’s  reward  system,  making  it  easier  to  adapt  to  changing 
circumstances as required.  
When designing their HRM systems, organizations have to decide not only which practices 
they are going to adopt, but also how they are going to implement them. One of the dimensions of the 
process  of  employment  practices  implementation  concerns  their  diffusion  among  different 
occupational groups of workers. While there is extensive literature on the adoption of HRM practices 
by organizations, less effort has been made to discern and compare the application of these practices to 
different  occupational  groups  of  workers.  Werner  and  Ward  (2004)  have  already  indicated  the 
significance of developing this area of research. .Following a comprehensive review of the literature 
on compensation-related issues, they concluded that there are numerous topics within the field that 
require further study. In particular, they asserted that little research had addressed payment system 
differences between groups of employees  
Despite being an underdeveloped issue, the diffusion of HRM practices among occupations 
has been indirectly tackled in the past. Hence, some studies assume that HRM practices are uniformly 
applied to the entire workforce within an organization (see, for example Huselid, 1995; or Snell and 
Dean, 1992). Other analyses focus on the examination of the implementation of these practices for a   4
certain occupation, wherein the “core” or largest occupational group within the organization is most 
frequently considered (see, for example, Batt, 2002; or Forth and Millward, 2004). 
However, a body of research that advocates the differential application of HRM practices to 
different types of jobs has emerged in recent years. This stream of research maintains that the specific 
contributions of different groups of employees to the objectives of the firm result in variability in the 
application of HRM practices among them. Lepak and Snell (2002) highlight the importance of this 
line of argument when they point out that “in order to study strategic HR at an organizational level, 
however, researchers have tended to aggregate—both conceptually and empirically—all employees as 
though  they  were  managed  with  a  single  (or  at  least  dominant)  HR  configuration.  While  such 
aggregation adds parsimony, we would argue that doing so masks potentially important aspects of how 
different employee groups are managed strategically”. Regarding the diffusion of pay practices, the 
existing literature focuses mainly on analyzing the consistency of wage levels across different types of 
jobs within companies. This literature suggests that employers apply a consistent pay standard to the 
entire workforce, paying either high or low wages to every occupation (see, for example, Groshen and 
Krueger, 1990; Bronars and Famulari, 1997; Cardoso, 2000; Gerlach and Stephan, 2006).  
In light of recent developments in the field, the objective of this paper is to contribute to the 
analysis  of the  use  of  pay  for  performance  systems,  paying  particular attention  to  their  diffusion 
among groups of workers. Two questions are addressed in this regard.  
First,  to  what  extent  does  occupational  category  influence  the  implementation  of  pay  for 
performance  systems  within  establishments?  Two  streams  of  research  that  could  contribute  to  an 
understanding of the implications of occupation for the use of pay for performance are identified. On 
the one hand, the best practices approach, the internal pay equity argument introduced by Bewley 
(1999), the positive effects brought by economies of scale and the bargaining theory support the 
existence of a significant connection in the application of variable pay across different types of jobs. 
From these models, it may be inferred that occupational status is not a significant determinant in the 
use of pay for performance. On the other hand, the line of research followed by authors such as Lepak 
and Snell (2002), Melian-Gonzalez and Verano-Tacoronte (2004 and 2006) and Lepak et al. (2007) 
provides evidence in favor of the idea that the use of HRM practices for different jobs depends on their   5
specific contribution to the objectives of the organization, which suggests that occupation certainly 
influences the adoption of pay for performance systems within establishments.   
The  second  question  concerns  whether  or  not  the  use  and  variability  of  use  between 
occupations of pay for performance are influenced by factors such as the size of the establishment, the 
presence of a human resource department and foreign ownership. Recent literature on the determinants 
of  the  use  of  pay  for  performance  points  to  these  variables  as  important  determinants  in  its 
implementation. Thus far, research in the field has centered on analysis of the factors that determine 
the use of pay for performance for a particular occupation or for the whole workforce within an 
organization. We intend to go a step further and examine not only how the factors mentioned shape the 
use of pay for performance, but also if the effect of the establishment size, the existence of a HRM 
department and belonging to a foreign company vary across occupations within the same firm.  
The analysis is based on a newly-created Spanish data set on HRM practices, which originated 
in a survey conducted in 2006 for a representative sample of Spanish manufacturing establishments. 
The data constitutes a unique source of information about a range of employment practices in Spanish 
organizations, and about pay for performance in particular. The major advantage of using this data set 
is that it contains information on the use of pay for performance for various occupational groups of 
workers within the same establishment. Our empirical strategy consists of studying the determinants of 
the use of any pay for performance, as well as three particular systems: pay linked to individual 
performance,  group  performance  and  plant  or  firm  performance.  The  following  occupations  are 
considered:  production  workers,  top  executives,  professionals,  administrative  workers,  middle 
managers and sales employees.   
The paper is structured as follows. The next section examines the theoretical arguments that 
shed some light on the diffusion of HRM practices and, specifically, on the diffusion of pay for 
performance for different occupational groups of workers. In the third section, the existing empirical 
literature on the diffusion of HRM practices across groups of workers is summarized. Then the lines of 
reasoning concerning the influence of firm size, HRM department and multinational company are 
reviewed. In section five, the data set used to perform our empirical analysis is described. The sixth   6
section  presents  the  results  of  the  empirical  analysis,  and  the  seventh  section  comprises  a  set  of 
conclusions. 
 
Theoretical approaches to the diffusion of pay for performance across occupations 
Despite the fact that literature on the topic is scarce, we can gain an insight into the diffusion 
of HRM practices through the examination of related bodies of research. Hence, some theoretical 
approaches to HRM suggest that work practices are uniformly applied to the entire workforce within 
an organization. One of these is the best practices approach, which defends the universality of high-
involvement practices (see Pfeffer 1998, among others). According to this literature, there is a set of 
practices  whose  adoption  generates  benefits  for  organizational  performance  irrespective  of  the 
particular  characteristics  of  the  firm;  pay  linked  to  performance  is  one  such  practice.  From  this 
perspective, it can be inferred that pay for performance will be homogeneously implemented across 
occupational groups of workers.  
The argument of internal pay equity considered by Bewley (1999) also helps us to shed light 
on the diffusion of pay practices within establishments. The author holds that employees take their 
colleagues’  pay  into  consideration  when  demanding  their  wages,  which  results  in  firms  imposing 
internal equity pay structures. These structures consist of “both uniformity in the application of rules 
setting  pay  and  a  set  of  beliefs  about  fair  relations  between  pay  and  its  determinants”  (Bewley, 
1999:70), and result in enhanced employee morale.  
An economies of scale point of view can also help us to understand the pattern of pay for 
performance use within establishments. The adoption of these systems implies the assumption of fixed 
costs in implementation. If they are applied to more than one group of workers, the fixed costs can be 
spread over more employees. Therefore, it is plausible to conclude that establishments may be more 
inclined  to  adopt  a  pay  for  performance  scheme  if  they  can  apply  them  to  various  occupations. 
Similarly, establishments that have already carried out a pay for performance plan for an occupation 
will find it easier to extend it to other groups of workers (see Jirjahn and Stephan, 2004).  
According to the bargaining theories of wage determination, if an organization generates rents 
and employees possess some bargaining power, they can fight for a share of those rents. As stated by   7
these  theories,  it  is  possible  that  the  worker’s  power  to  appropriate  firm  rents  leads  to  a  high 
correlation in the level of wages between occupations. This may be due, for example, to the fact that 
the bargaining power of workers is uniform across job categories, or that employees band together in 
order to exert more pressure on the employer (see Groshen, 1991). A dimension of the bargaining 
theory that is relevant for our analysis is the influence that trade unions have on the implementation of 
pay for performance. It is often argued that trade unions oppose the discriminatory application of pay 
systems across employees, which suggests that they will favor the uniform adoption of pay practices 
for different occupations.  
A contrasting perspective advocates the differential application of HRM practices to different 
groups  of  workers.  This  line  of  research  maintains  that  the  specific  contributions  of  groups  of 
employees to the objectives of the firm result in variability in the application of HRM practices within 
organizations. Among the existing studies in this field, the work of Lepak and Snell (1999) is worth 
mentioning. These authors made use of the human capital theory, the resource-based view of the firm 
and transaction costs economics to support the idea that the practices of HRM applied to a group of 
employees  depend  on  the  particular  features  of  the  group.  Their  argument  may  be  explained  as 
follows.  The  human  capital  of  an  organization  can  be  classified  according  to  their  value  and 
uniqueness to the firm, which results in the establishment of different employment modes within the 
organization, each of which is associated with a particular type of employment relationship. As a 
result,  organizations  apply  specific  HRM  practices  to  each  group  of  employees  within  the  firm 
depending on the employment relationship established between the group and the employer. One of 
the dimensions of HRM that is specifically cited by Lepak and Snell (1999) concerns compensation 
issues. In line with this argument, Baron and Kreps (1999) defend the need to design appropriate 
compensation systems for the different occupational groups of workers present within organizations. 
The authors stated that the determination of the level, basis, distribution and form of compensation 
often  involves  formal  job  analysis  and  evaluation,  because  each  job  is  characterized  in  terms  of 
various  common  dimensions  and  distinctions,  such  as  the  types  and  complexity  of  knowledge 
required,  the  number  of  employees  supervised,  the  amount  of  capital  overseen,  the  type  and 
unpleasantness of working conditions, and so on. Overall, this stream of research suggests that we   8
might find differences in the implementation of pay for performance across occupational groups of 
workers due to their different contributions to establishment performance and their specific attributes 
and functions within the organization.  
 
Review of the empirical evidence on the diffusion of HRM practices across occupations 
In this section, we summarize existing evidence of the diffusion of HRM practices across 
groups of workers. In order to gain more insight into the diffusion of pay practices in particular, 
considerable attention is paid to the research that has focused on the consistency of wage levels within 
organizations. 
Lepak and Snell (2002) tested the proposition that HRM practices are differentially applied 
when managing employee groups due to their particular value and uniqueness to the firm. As they 
pointed out in a previous study (see Lepak and Snell, 1999), these particularities give rise to different 
HRM configurations across groups of workers. In order to test this assumption, the authors used data 
from  148  publicly  traded  companies  in  order  to  compare  how  HRM  practices  were  used  when 
managing groups of employees that contributed in different ways to organizational competitiveness. 
The results obtained showed that the implementation of HRM systems varied across groups, which 
reinforced the hypothesis that the value and uniqueness of a group of workers influence its HRM 
configuration.  
Lepak et al. (2007) empirically tested how HRM systems are applied when managing two 
different  groups  of  workers  within  firms.  The  authors  distinguished  between  those  workers  that 
contribute  directly  to  the  execution  of  organizational  objectives,  who  were  referred  to  as  core 
employees,  and  those  that  help  them  to  achieve  the  objectives,  who  were  described  as  support 
employees.  The  main  purpose  of  this  work  is  to  verify  whether  the  implementation  of  high-
involvement  HRM  systems  was  always  greater  for  core  employees  in  comparison  with  support 
workers  or,  alternatively,  if the  relative  use of this  managerial  approach  between  the two  groups 
depended on the business strategy, the human resource philosophy and the industry sector to which the 
firm belonged. The authors found no evidence in favor of the first hypothesis, while their results   9
revealed that the industry sector influenced the use of high-involvement HRM systems for the two 
groups of workers in comparative terms. 
Melian-Gonzalez  and  Verano-Tacoronte  (2004,  2006)  argued  that,  contrary  to  the 
universalistic view proposed by the best practices approach to HRM, the system of HRM practices 
adopted by a firm depends both on external factors and on internal contingencies. More precisely, they 
pointed  out  that  the  practices  listed  by  many  authors  as  being  beneficial  for  organizational 
performance  were  certainly  used  by  firms,  but  they  specified  that  the  implementation  of  those 
practices might vary across jobs with different attributes. Using questionnaire information obtained 
from human resource managers in Spanish companies, they compared the application of best human 
resource practices for four groups of employees, which were classified according to their value and 
uniqueness to the firm. The results obtained showed significant differences among  groups, which 
contradicts the universalistic approach to HRM. As for compensation systems, their results showed 
that the use of pay for performance was not uniform across types of jobs. 
We now turn to the examination of studies that analyze the consistency of pay levels across 
groups of workers within organizations. Exploring United States data on wage structures taken from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Groshen and Krueger (1990) found the existence of an important 
correlation among groups of workers. In particular, they assessed the salaries of nurses, food service 
workers, physical therapists and radiographers, concluding that if a hospital paid high wages to one of 
these groups in comparison with other hospitals, it would pay relatively high wages to the other 
occupations, and vice-versa. 
Bronars and Famulari (1997) used data on white-collar workers from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics in order to analyze variation in wages within and across establishments. In particular, two 
categories  of  employees  were  examined:  professional  employees,  which  include  managers  and 
administrators, and non-professional, referring to technical and clerical workers. The authors noted the 
existence of positive and significant correlation coefficients between the relevant occupational groups 
across establishments, which reinforces the predictions of team production theories. 
Cardoso (2000) examined the uniformity of pay levels in Portuguese firms using information 
on well-defined and very contrasting occupations. The job categories chosen for the analysis were   10
computer systems analyst, telephone switchboard operator, secretary, janitor and chauffeur, which 
comprise a variety of tasks, different industries, typically male and female professions, blue and white 
collar  occupations  and  various  required  qualifications.  Controlling  for  workers’  human  capital 
characteristics, the hypothesis of the existence of a consistent pay level within firms was supported by 
the empirical results. Moreover, the author detected the existence of clusters of occupations whose 
wages were strongly connected. In particular, correlations were higher between similar occupations 
and between occupations that required lower skills, whereas the wages of more qualified workers did 
not usually match the pay policy of the firm. 
A recent study by Gerlach and Stephan (2006) investigated the stability of wages among 
occupations  and  how  the  internal  structure  of  pay  was  affected  by  the  mechanism  of  wage 
determination  using  a  German  data  set.  The  authors  considered  seven  categories  of  workers  that 
require  different  levels  of  qualification:  trained  office  clerks,  transport  workers,  storekeepers, 
millwrights,  electricians,  trained  wholesale  or  retail  salespeople,  and  mechanical  engineers.  Their 
results supported the consistency of wage policies within firms, even after controlling for occupational 
and firm characteristics.  
 
The determinants of pay for performance 
Previous research has shown that establishment size, the presence of a HRM department and 
belonging to a multinational company may be important determinants of the employer’s decision to 
adopt pay for performance plans. Regarding the impact of establishment size, there is no consensus 
among researchers on the direction of its influence. On the one hand, the fixed costs of implementing a 
pay  for  performance  scheme  are  spread  over  more  employees  when  the  establishment  is  large, 
supporting the idea that the likelihood of implementing such system will increase with the size of the 
establishment. Moreover, large establishments more frequently own or have access to the technology 
and knowledge necessary to develop pay for performance plans (see Long and Shields, 2005). On the 
other hand, monitoring worker effort is more complicated in large workplaces than in establishments 
of a smaller size, which might favor the adoption of schemes based on collective results, whereas 
those  systems  linked  to  individual  performance  are  more  likely  to  be  implemented  in  small   11
establishments  (see  Belfield,  2007).  We  can  expect,  then,  that  the  influence  of  the  size  of  the 
establishment  varies  depending  on  the  compensation  system  taken  into  account.  Besides  being 
influential in shaping the adoption of pay for performance, it is plausible to think that the impact of the 
size of the establishment varies across occupations. Hence, monitoring workers’ effort could be more 
difficult for certain groups of workers than for others. As a consequence, it is possible that the effect of 
the size of the establishment on the adoption of pay for performance is stronger for some occupations.  
In addition, the literature on HRM has found evidence in favor of the idea that the presence of 
a department dealing with HRM issues in an organization has a bearing on the implementation of 
HRM practices. In particular, the existence of a HRM department might facilitate the adoption of 
sophisticated practices such as pay linked to performance (see Shaw et al., 1993). Moreover, it could 
contribute  to  the  success  of  pay  for  performance  through  the  establishment  of  close  employer-
employee relationships. This prompts the conclusion that the use of contingent compensation schemes 
will be more likely in those establishments where a HRM department is present. The existence of a 
HRM department indicates that the establishment considers human resources to be a fundamental 
asset, as well as one of the determinants of its success or failure. Employers will design their pay 
policies  in  accordance  with  this  philosophy.  In  other  words,  they  will  manage  human  resources 
groups, paying considerable attention to their particular features and contributions to organizational 
objectives. Consequently, we can expect that the influence of the HRM department is contingent on 
the occupation being taken into consideration. 
Finally, as multinational companies operate in different countries, they can encounter diverse 
institutional settings. The fact that they operate in an international context facilitates the acquisition of 
the experience and resources needed to implement a wider range of practices, and makes it possible to 
develop more complex HRM systems. Moreover, certain practices employed in the parent firm are 
transferred  to  its  subsidiaries  (see  Walsh,  2001).  As  a  result,  it  is  possible  that  foreign-owned 
companies spread the use of pay for performance among their branches, making the use of these 
systems  more  likely  in  comparison  with  domestically-owned  establishments.  Since  multinational 
corporations  encounter  diverse  institutional  settings,  they  have  access  to  extensive  knowledge 
concerning HRM. Consequently, they may implement more sophisticated HRM systems, which could   12
consist  of  a  differential  adoption  of  HRM  practices  across  occupational  groups  of  workers.  It  is 
possible, then, that differences may be observed in the influence of the multinational variables on the 
use of pay for performance among occupations.   
  
Data and Variable Description 
The  data  was  gathered  in  2006  through  personal  interviews  with  managers  in  Spanish 
manufacturing plants with fifty or more employees, and represents a unique source of information 
about a range of human resource practices in Spanish firms. Information was collected at the plant 
level, as this is the unit at which decisions about the implementation of the practices of interest are 
taken. Furthermore, knowledge of the issues included in the questionnaire is expected to be greater at 
plant level and, as a consequence, the data obtained should be more reliable. 
The process of development of the data base was as follows. Once the objectives and scope of 
our study were defined, and in order to properly design the questionnaire, a thorough examination of 
the literature related to the purpose of the project was carried out. With the information gathered, a 
first draft of the questionnaire was drawn up jointly by the members of the research group and the firm 
in charge of the fieldwork. The questionnaire was pre-tested in nine plants and then modified in 
several ways to come up with its final version.  
The final version of the questionnaire consists of 152 questions grouped in the following eight 
sections:  General  Characteristics  of  the  Plant  and  the  Firm,  HRM,  Payment  Systems,  Work 
Organization, Human Resource Outcomes, Human Resource Function, Other Groups of Workers and 
Characteristics of the Plant Manager. The data was drawn from personal interviews with one of the 
managers at the plant. It was thought that questions should be addressed to the general manager or to 
the human resource manager. In practice the human resource manager was the figure most frequently 
interviewed.  
The  range  of  potential  respondents  for  the  purposes  of  the  survey  comprised  all  Spanish 
manufacturing establishments which had fifty or more employees in 2005. The aim was to obtain a 
sample of one thousand units, in order to arrive at conclusions that could be extrapolated to the entire 
Spanish manufacturing industry. After stratification by sector, size and location, a random selection of   13
workplaces  was  obtained  from  the  Spanish  Central  Directory  of  Firms  (Directorio  Central  de 
Empresas, DIRCE) of the Spanish National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE), 
using data from 2005.  
The interviews with those managers that agreed to answer our questionnaire were performed 
by  specially-trained  professionals  in  computer-assisted  telephone  interviews  (CATI).  The 
establishments  were  first  approached  by  letter  or  email,  indicating  the  goals  of  the  survey  and 
including  a  copy  of  the  questionnaire.  The  final  sample  comprises  1,001  establishments,  which 
matches expectations regarding the size of the data set and yields a response rate of 34.1 per cent. The 
distribution of the establishments sampled across industrial sectors and size intervals is described in 
Table 1.  
As dependent variables, we consider the general use of pay for performance as well as three 
particular schemes: pay based on individual performance, pay based on group performance and pay 
based on plant or firm performance. The pay for performance variables capture whether most of the 
employees of the occupation under consideration received pay linked to performance in 2005. Since 
the dependent variables are dichotomous, logit models are used.  
Our  sample  contains  information  on  the  use  of  pay  for  performance  for  six  occupational 
groups of workers, which are representative of the hierarchical structure of a typical manufacturing 
establishment: production workers, top executives, professionals, administrative employees, middle 
managers and sales workers. For the purposes of our study, the data for the six occupations is pooled.  
Two groups of variables are included in the regressions as explanatory factors. The first set 
comprises the six dummies that make reference to the occupational group. The production workers 
category is taken as a reference in the analysis. In addition, three variables that represent significant 
establishment  features  are  accounted  for.  These  variables  are  the  size  of  the  establishment, 
membership of a multinational corporation and the presence of a specific department dealing with 
HRM. The size of the establishment is represented by three dummies: Small size (which takes value 
one if the establishment has between 50 and 99 employees, and zero otherwise), Medium size (which 
takes value one if the establishment has between 100 and 499 employees, and zero otherwise) and   14
Large  size  (which  takes  value  one  if  the  establishment  has  500  or  more  employees,  and  zero 
otherwise).  
Prior to estimating the equations of interest, we examine the incidence of pay for performance 
for each occupational category of workers (see Table 2). In the first column, we observe that sales 
employees  is  the  group  that  most  frequently  receives  pay  for  performance  (63.0  per  cent  of 
workplaces), followed by top executives (54.9 per cent of workplaces), middle managers (44.0 per 
cent of workplaces) and professional workers (42.4 per cent of workplaces). Production workers (31.0 
per  cent  of  workplaces)  and  administrative  workers  (25.0  per  cent  of  workplaces)  close  this 
classification. The use of pay for performance based on individual output reproduces the same pattern, 
with  sales  workers  occupying  the  top  position  (49.3  per  cent  of  workplaces)  and  administrative 
workers coming in last place (14.2 per cent of workplaces). With regard to the implementation of pay 
for group performance, the ranking of employees receiving this type of compensation changes in 
relation to the previous scheme. The top executives’ occupation shows the highest frequency of pay 
for performance use (15.3 per cent of workplaces). Our data reveals that the percentage of workplaces 
using group performance pay is quite similar for each occupation, with figures that vary between the 
15.3 per cent for top executives and the 11.4 per cent for sales workers. The administrative workers 
category is an exception in this regard, displaying a very low diffusion of this type of scheme (6.9 per 
cent of workplaces). As far as plant or firm pay for performance is concerned, it may be noted that the 
use of this system is greater for high-hierarchical occupations and diminishes for workers lower on the 
hierarchical scale. Hence, top executives are the occupation with the highest incidence of this pay for 
performance  scheme  (27.2  per  cent  of  workplaces),  followed  by  professionals  (17.7  per  cent  of 
workplaces), middle managers (16.2 per cent of workplaces) and sales workers (14.0 per cent of 
workplaces).  At  the  lower  end  of  the  classification  are  administrative  workers  (10.2  per  cent  of 
workplaces)  and  production  workers  (9.7  per  cent  of  workplaces).  An  observation  that  is  worth 
mentioning is the similar pattern followed by professional workers and middle managers regarding the 
use of the various schemes of pay for performance. 
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Results and Discussion 
In what follows, the results of the empirical analysis are described. Tables 3 to 6 present the 
results of the estimated regressions for the general use of pay for performance as well as the three 
particular  systems  analyzed.  Each  table  includes  four  models:  the  first  one  accounts  for  the 
occupational dummies and the establishment characteristics as explanatory variables, and the other 
three  models  include  the  interactions  between  the  occupational  variables  and  the  size  of  the 
establishment (Model 2), belonging to a multinational company (Model 3) and the HRM department 
(Model 4). We have chosen to include the interaction terms of each variable separately in order to 
facilitate the interpretation of the results and avoid a potential problem of multicollinearity that may 
bias the estimated coefficients.  
Regarding  the  use  of  any  pay  for  performance  (see  Table  3),  the  coefficients  for  the 
occupational dummies are all highly significant and, with the exception of the administrative workers 
category, of a positive sign. The high significance of the results supports the idea that occupation is a 
relevant determinant of pay for performance use. The sign of the coefficients indicates that, with the 
exception  of  administrative  employees,  the  remaining  occupations  have  a  higher  probability  of 
receiving pay for performance in comparison with production workers. In order to gain more insight 
into the influence of the occupational variables, Wald tests of equality between pairs of occupations 
were carried out. The first column of Table 7 displays the results of the tests corresponding to the 
general use of pay for performance. As may be observed, the statistics are mostly highly significant, 
which reinforces the hypothesis that the implementation of pay for performance schemes varies across 
groups of workers. Sales workers is the occupation with highest use of pay for performance, followed 
by top executives. On the other hand, the administrative workers group is the one with lowest adoption 
of  pay  for  performance.  Finally,  there  are  no  significant  differences  in  the  adoption  of  pay  for 
performance between professionals and middle managers.  
Looking at the second set of explanatory variables included in Table 3, the analysis reveals 
that  the  use  of  pay  for  performance  is  higher  in  establishments  of  medium  and  large  size  in 
comparison with small plants, which is in line with previous analyses (see Foss and Laursen, 2005; or 
Barth et al. 2008). This finding supports the argument that large establishments have the resources   16
needed to develop and manage pay for performance systems, and that they can spread the costs of 
implementation across a higher number of employees. Regression results identify a positive and highly 
significant effect of the multinational variable, which is consistent with the idea that foreign-owned 
companies have a tendency to resort to the types of compensation schemes under study. Finally, the 
HRM  department  variable  also  correlates  positively  and  significantly  with  the  use  of  pay  for 
performance, supporting the hypothesis that the presence of a department dealing with HRM promotes 
the adoption of pay for performance plans.  
The inclusion of the interaction terms (models 2, 3 and 4) do not substantially change the 
results displayed in model 1. However, two interesting outcomes are worth noticing regarding the 
influence of the top executives’ occupation. First, model 2 shows that top executives are more likely to 
receive  pay  for  performance  in  medium  and  large  plants  than  in  establishments  of  a  small  size. 
Second, in addition to the positive effect exerted by the top executives and the multinational variables, 
we  observe  that  it  is  more  likely  that  this  occupation  would  receive  pay  for  performance  in 
establishments  belonging  to  a  multinational  corporation  in  comparison  with  domestically-owned 
companies.  
Turning to the examination of the results obtained for pay linked to individual performance, 
we observe that they are similar to those obtained for the use of any pay for performance; both in the 
models with and without interactions (see Table 4). The occupational dummies are highly significant 
and, with the exception of administrative workers, of a positive sign. Turning to the results of Table 7, 
the  differences  between  occupations  are  statistically  significant  with  the  exception  of  the  pair, 
professionals-middle managers. Sales workers are the employees that are most likely to receive pay 
linked to individual performance, followed by top executives. In this case, the difference between the 
coefficients of both occupations is higher in comparison with the use of any pay for performance plan. 
A significant difference with the results of pay for performance of any kind is that, in the case of 
individual pay for performance, the likelihood of adopting this particular scheme increases in medium-
sized establishments in comparison with those of a small size, whereas its use in large plants is not 
statistically  different  from  its  adoption  in  small  establishments.  However,  when  the  first  set  of   17
interactions (Model 2) is included, the interaction coefficients between the top executive and the size 
dummies emerge again as positive and statistically significant.  
Regarding the use of pay linked to group results (see Table 5), the coefficients obtained for the 
professional  and  sales  occupations  are  not  statistically  significant.  Top  executives  and  middle 
managers display a higher probability of pay for group performance in comparison with production 
workers, and the opposite occurs for administrative workers. The Wald tests show that the differences 
between administrative workers and the other categories are significant. This backs up the idea that the 
pattern of adoption of pay for performance for this occupation differs notably from the other groups. 
In addition, the comparison between top executives and sales workers is also statistically significant, 
whereas for the other occupational pairs the null hypothesis of coefficient equality cannot be rejected. 
As expected, the use of this system of pay increases with the size of the establishment, membership of 
a multinational corporation and the presence of a HRM department. Moreover, none of the interaction 
terms emerges as a significant determinant in our estimated equations. 
As far as plant or firm performance is concerned, the results do not differ substantially from 
the ones that have already been described (see Table 6). The major finding regarding this pay scheme 
is  related  to  the  occupational  dummies.  In  this  case,  top  executives  are  the  group  with  a  higher 
probability  of  receiving  pay  linked  to  plant  or  firm  performance,  whereas  sales  workers  are  the 
employees with a lower probability of perceiving this type of pay for performance. This result is 
related to the findings of O’Shaughnessy (1998), who found support for the fact that the effort of 
CEOs is more directly connected with the performance of the organization and, consequently, it is 
more likely that they receive pay linked to firm performance than workers at lower levels in the 
hierarchy.  With  the  exception  of  the  pairs  constituted  by  middle  managers  and  top  executives, 
professionals and sales workers, the other differences between coefficients are statistically significant. 
 
Conclusions 
In  this  study,  we  have  analyzed  the  diffusion  of  pay  for  performance  systems  across 
occupational  groups  of  workers  using  a  Spanish  sample  of  manufacturing  establishments.  Taking 
advantage of the exhaustive information on pay for performance contained in the data set, we have   18
been able to examine the influence of occupational category on the use of pay for performance and 
pay based on individual, group and plant or firm results, as well as the incidence of the size of the 
establishment,  belonging  to  a  multinational  corporation,  and  the  presence  of  a  human  resources 
department. 
The empirical analysis has revealed some interesting facts regarding the relationship between 
occupational status and the use of pay for performance. First, occupation is a significant factor in 
explaining the incidence of pay for performance. Second, there are notable differences in the diffusion 
of these systems among production workers, top executives, professionals, administrative workers, 
middle managers and sales workers. These results match the findings of Melian-Gonzalez and Verano-
Tacoronte (2004 and 2006), Lepak and Snell (2002) and Lepak et al. (2007), who suggested that 
employers apply specific HRM practices to each occupational group of workers according to their 
different contributions to the objectives of the organization. Therefore, the argument of consistency 
across  groups  of  workers  found  in  the  literature  on  wage  levels  seems  not  to  apply  to  pay  for 
performance.  
As far as the comparison among occupations is concerned, we have identified certain patterns 
of pay for performance implementation. Sales workers constitute the group with a higher coverage of 
pay for performance, followed closely by top executives. The sales workers occupation is also highly 
related to the incidence of pay for individual performance. A valid explanation for this finding may be 
that this group carries out tasks that are usually easy to measure in individual terms, so it is likely that 
they are rewarded with pay based on individual performance. On the other hand, top executives stand 
out as an important determinant of pay based on plant or firm performance. This result might be 
indicative of their strong impact on organizational performance, which makes it desirable to link their 
compensation to company results. Finally, and with the exception of administrative workers, those 
groups that can be classified as white collar (i.e.. top executives, professionals, middle managers and 
sales  workers)  are,  in  general,  more  likely  to  receive  pay  for  performance  in  comparison  with 
production  workers  or  blue  collar  workers.  This  outcome  supports  the  existence  of  clusters  of 
occupations,  white  collar  versus  blue  collar,  which  receive  similar  compensation  systems  (see 
Cardoso, 2000).   19
In addition to the significance of the occupational variables, the findings confirm the important 
role played by the size of the establishment, belonging to a multinational company and the presence of 
a HRM department as determinants of pay for performance use. Hence, the three variables exert a 
positive and highly significant effect on the use of any of these kinds of pay plans. The only exception 
to this outcome is observed in the use of pay for individual performance, which is not significantly 
different in large establishments as compared with in plants of a small size. Finally, the inclusion of 
the interaction terms between the occupational dummies and the three establishment features in the 
empirical analysis reveals that, in general terms, the influence of size, belonging to a multinational 
company  and  the  presence  of  a  HRM  department  do  not  vary  across  occupations.  However,  an 
interesting result concerning the effect of the interaction terms is that top executives are more likely to 
receive pay for performance and, in particular individual pay for performance, in medium and large 
establishments, as well as in plants that belong to a foreign-owned company. 
To sum up, this study has served various purposes. First, it has pointed to the relevance of 
analyzing the similarities and differences in the implementation of HRM practices across occupations. 
Second, it has broadened the scope of study of pay for performance by making it possible to compare 
the diffusion of several pay for performance schemes across occupations. Finally, it has contributed to 
the literature on the determinants of pay for performance using an approach to the question that has 
not been adopted in previous research. Further investigation is clearly required in order to broaden the 
understanding of occupational differences in pay for performance diffusion, so we hope this work 
serves to launch research on this topic and, more generally, on the diffusion of HRM practices across 
occupations. 
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Table 1: Size and sector distribution of the establishments in the sample 
MANUFACTURING SECTOR  50 to 99 workers  100 to 499 
workers 
500 workers or 
more  TOTAL 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco   75  70  11  156 
Textile Industry, Wearing Apparel, Leather and Footwear  44  24  1  69 
Wood and Cork  14  20  0  34 
Paper, Editing and Graphic Design  32  31  6  69 
Chemical Industry  29  47  4  80 
Rubber and Plastic Products  29  34  5  68 
Non-metallic Mineral Products  53  50  5  108 
Metallurgy and Fabricated Mechanical Products   85  63  6  154 
Machinery and Mechanical Equipment  39  34  2  75 
Electrical, Electronic and Optical Products and Equipment  31  36  4  71 
Transport Equipment  15  37  8  60 
Other Manufacturing Industries  38  18  1  57 
TOTAL  484  464  53  1001 
 
 
Table 2: Percentage of establishments using pay for performance for the different occupations 
 
Pay for performance for 
the majority of workers in 
the occupation 
Pay for individual 
performance for the 
majority of workers in the 
occupation 
Pay for group performance 
for the majority of workers 
in the occupation 
Pay for plant or firm 
performance for the 
majority of workers in the 
occupation 
Production workers  31.0  18.2  11.5  9.7 
Top executives  54.9  32.8  15.3  27.2 
Professionals  42.4  24.7  13.7  17.7 
Administrative workers  25.0  14.2  6.9  10.2 
Middle managers  44.0  25.0  14.5  16.2 













   24
Table 3: Determinants of pay for performance use, logit regressions 
VARIABLES  MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3  MODEL 4 
















































































Top executive x Medium size  -  .447** 
(.203) 
-  - 
Top executive x Large size  -  .869* 
(.473) 
-  - 
Professional x Medium size  -  .068 
(.202) 
-  - 
Professional x Large size  -  .486 
(.441) 
-  - 
Administrative x Medium size  -  .048 
(.217) 
-  - 
Administrative x Large size  -  -.073 
(.450) 
-  - 
Middle manager x Medium size  -  .015 
(.206) 
-  - 
Middle manager x Large size  -  -.107 
(.433) 
-  - 
Sales worker x Medium size  -  .089 
(.228) 
-  - 
Sales worker x Large size  -  -.413 
(.509) 
-  - 
Top executive x Multinational  -  -  .464* 
(.249) 
- 
Professional x Multinational  -  -  .081 
(.254) 
- 
Administrative x Multinational  -  -  .167 
(.275) 
- 
Middle manager x Multinational  -  -  .260 
(.256) 
- 
Sales worker x Multinational  -  -  -.102 
(.278) 
- 
Top executive x HR Department  -  -  -  -.123 
(.248) 
Professional x HR Department  -  -  -  -.134 
(.275) 
Administrative x HR Department  -  -  -  -.033 
(.334) 
Middle manager x HR Department  -  -  -  -.298 
(.285) 
Sales worker x HR Department  -  -  -  -.466 
(.395) 
Chi-squared  590.15***  604.15***  596.73***  383.17*** 
Pseudo R2  0.0816  0.0836  0.0825  0.0828 
N  5310  5310  5310  5288 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4: Determinants of pay linked to individual performance, logit regressions 
VARIABLES  MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3  MODEL 4 
















































































Top executive x Medium size  -  .483** 
(.229) 
-  - 
Top executive x Large size  -  .935* 
(.516) 
-  - 
Professional x Medium size  -  .072 
(.235) 
-  - 
Professional x Large size  -  .684 
(.527) 
-  - 
Administrative x Medium size  -  -.000 
(.261) 
-  - 
Administrative x Large size  -  .170 
(.597) 
-  - 
Middle manager x Medium size  -  -.146 
(.239) 
-  - 
Middle manager x Large size  -  .180 
(.537) 
-  - 
Sales worker x Medium size  -  .086 
(.242) 
-  - 
Sales worker x Large size  -  .114 
(.571) 
-  - 
Top executive x Multinational  -  -  .464* 
(.249) 
- 
Professional x Multinational  -  -  .081 
(.254) 
- 
Administrative x Multinational  -  -  .167 
(.275) 
- 
Middle manager x Multinational  -  -  .260 
(.256) 
- 
Sales worker x Multinational  -  -  -.102 
(.278) 
- 
Top executive x HR Department  -  -  -  .286 
(.208) 
Professional x HR Department  -  -  -  .056 
(.216) 
Administrative x HR Department  -  -  -  -.320 
(.242) 
Middle manager x HR Department  -  -  -  -.043 
(.222) 
Sales worker x HR Department  -  -  -  -.036 
(.222) 
Chi-squared  434.14***  447.25***  440.44***  439.91*** 
Pseudo R2  0.0717  0.0738  0.0727  0.0726 
N  5284  5284  5284  5284 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 5: Determinants of pay linked to group performance, logit regressions 
VARIABLES  MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3  MODEL 4 
















































































Top executive x Medium size  -  -.044 
(.294) 
-  - 
Top executive x Large size  -  -.213 
(.506) 
-  - 
Professional x Medium size  -  -.073 
(.298) 
-  - 
Professional x Large size  -  -.432 
(.525) 
-  - 
Administrative x Medium size  -  .037 
(.354) 
-  - 
Administrative x Large size  -  -.373 
(.609) 
-  - 
Middle manager x Medium size  -  -.065 
(.300) 
-  - 
Middle manager x Large size  -  -.803 
(.542) 
-  - 
Sales worker x Medium size  -  -.230 
(.355) 
-  - 
Sales worker x Large size  -  .028 
(.593) 
-  - 
Top executive x Multinational  -  -  .007 
(.298) 
- 
Professional x Multinational  -  -  -.391 
(.311) 
- 
Administrative x Multinational  -  -  .013 
(.351) 
- 
Middle manager x Multinational  -  -  -.282 
(.309) 
- 
Sales worker x Multinational  -  -  -.347 
(.370) 
- 
Top executive x HR Department  -  -  -  .177 
(.290) 
Professional x HR Department  -  -  -  -.223 
(.281) 
Administrative x HR Department  -  -  -  -.461 
(.338) 
Middle manager x HR Department  -  -  -  -.218 
(.287) 
Sales worker x HR Department  -  -  -  -.330 
(.349) 
Chi-squared  141.75***  145.93***  145.22***  145.96*** 
Pseudo R2  0.0362  0.0373  0.0371  0.0373 
N  5248  5248  5248  5248 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 6: Determinants of pay linked to plant or firm performance, logit regressions 
VARIABLES  MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3  MODEL 4 
















































































Top executive x Medium size  -  .025 
(.289) 
-  - 
Top executive x Large size  -  .434 
(.537) 
-  - 
Professional x Medium size  -  -.018 
(.305) 
-  - 
Professional x Large size  -  .496 
(.550) 
-  - 
Administrative x Medium size  -  .051 
(.340) 
-  - 
Administrative x Large size  -  .286 
(.595) 
-  - 
Middle manager x Medium size  -  .021 
(.315) 
-  - 
Middle manager x Large size  -  .076 
(.567) 
-  - 
Sales worker x Medium size  -  -.136 
(.344) 
-  - 
Sales worker x Large size  -  -.971 
(.777) 
-  - 
Top executive x Multinational  -  -  -.249 
(.284) 
- 
Professional x Multinational  -  -  -.400 
(.296) 
- 
Administrative x Multinational  -  -  -.174 
(.320) 
- 
Middle manager x Multinational  -  -  -.492 
(.304) 
- 
Sales worker x Multinational  -  -  -.225 
(.340) 
- 
Top executive x HR Department  -  -  -  -.123 
(.248) 
Professional x HR Department  -  -  -  -.134 
(.275) 
Administrative x HR Department  -  -  -  -.033 
(.334) 
Middle manager x HR Department  -  -  -  -.298 
(.285) 
Sales worker x HR Department  -  -  -  -.466 
(.395) 
Chi-squared  380.57***  386.65***  383.90***  383.17*** 
Pseudo R2  0.0823  0.0836  0.0830  0.0828 
N  5288  5288  5288  5288 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 7: Wald tests: chi-squared values 
  ANY  INDIVIDUAL  GROUP  PLANT OR FIRM 
Sales worker -  Top executive  11.51***  45.38***  3.91**
a  37.56***
 a 
Sales worker – Professional  68.28***  103.19***  1.21
 a  3.17*
 a 
Sales worker – Administrative  225.59***  216.01***  10.11***
   5.91** 
Sales worker – Middle manager  58.40***  98.24***  2.13
 a  0.78
 a 
Top executive – Professional  30.99***  15.37***  1.08  26.72*** 
Top executive – Administrative  176.71***  88.26  32.23***  88.27 
Top executive – Middle manager  23.99***  14.32***  0.34  35.95*** 
Middle manager - Professional  0.31  0.00  0.19
 a  0.99
 a 
Middle manager - Administrative  72.30***   32.72***  25.85***
   13.25*** 
Professional - Administrative  66.08***  33.28***  22.51***  21.75*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Note: Table 7 displays the results of the tests of coefficient equality obtained in the first model of tables 3 to 6. In each cell, we test the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient of the first occupation equals the coefficient of the second occupation versus the alternative hypothesis that the 
coefficient of the first occupation is higher than the coefficient of the second occupation. In the cells with a superscript, we test the null 
hypothesis versus the alternative hypothesis that the coefficient of the second occupation is higher than the coefficient of the first occupation. 
 
 